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How MUCH LAND CAN A SAND PUMP Dump: STOP THE
BEACH RENOURISHMENT, INC. v. FLA. DEP'T OF
ENVTL. PROT.
Justin Ponds*
"[T]he old man always thought of [the sea] . . . as something that
gave or withheld great favours, and if she did wild or wicked
things it was because she could not help them."
- Ernest Hemingway,
The Old Man and the Sea.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Tammy Alford is a retired schoolteacher who bought a house on Sand-
trap Road near Destin, Florida.2 Suzy Spence is a small business owner
with her office a few blocks down from Tammy.3 When the State tried to
build a public beach between their property and the oceanfront,4 the two
women and their neighbors fought their case all the way to the United
States Supreme Court. This is their story.
It all came down to two issues before the Court: (1) Could a judicial
decision "take" private property rights such that the Fifth Amendment re-
quired "just compensation," and, if so, (2) did the Florida Supreme Court's
decision actually take away any established rights? The Court split four to
four on the first issue but unanimously answered no to the second
question.'
Ultimately, the Court's self-restraint allowed the State to create an ar-
tificial public beach and separate the upland owners' backyards from the
shoreline.6 For the locals, it looked like their oceanfront property turned
* B.S., J.D., Mississippi College. I extend my utmost appreciation to the Mississippi College
School of Law for embracing our Christian principles that encourage respect and compassion among
the faculty, administration, and student body. My most genuine thanks go to Professor Alina Ng for
supervising me throughout this Note's preparation and for challenging me to develop a more nuanced
view of "property." I dedicate this Note to my loving family for teaching me to be independent in my
thoughts and selfless in my actions-and especially to my mom for heel-toeing it with me along
Florida's beautiful panhandle to research this case.
1. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE OLD MAN AND THE SEA 30 (Scribner 2003) (1952).
2. Mark D. Evans, Ruling Trips Beach Restoration Plan, THE DESTIN TO 30A BEACH BLOG
(Apr. 29, 2006), http://destinlandconnection.blogspot.com/2006_04 01_archive.html.
3. SEA DUNES REALTY, http://www.seadunesrealty.com/ (last visited May 9, 2012).
4. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 55 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
5. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2597, 2613
(2010).
6. Id. at 2612.
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into "oceanview property,"' and even the Court believed its holding pro-
duced an "arguably odd result."' Even so, the majority deferred to the
Florida Supreme Court,' which quietly admitted in a footnote, "There is a
point where such a separation would materially and substantially impair
the upland owner's access, thereby resulting in an unconstitutional tak-
ing . . . ."1o This Note sets sail to find that point and deliver a sense of
resolve to these seaside property owners more so than a mere footnote
might provide. Part II describes the facts involved for these beachfront
property owners and reveals the case's procedural history. Part III ex-
plores the legal history behind oceanfront property entitlements, the legis-
lation involved, and the Takings Clause. Then, Part IV explains the law's
application to the facts at hand in the instant case. Part V analyzes the
Court's restraint and applies a balancing test under nuisance laws to pro-
vide a more practical platform for these competing property interests. Fi-
nally, Part VI concludes the Note and encourages oceanfront property
owners to watch carefully for the point at which these types of projects may
turn into unreasonable interferences.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hurricane Opal devastated Florida's panhandle in 1995 and seriously
eroded the shorelines along Okaloosa and Walton counties; almost a dec-
ade later, Florida's Department of Environmental Protection ("the Depart-
ment") issued a Notice of Intent to permit a nearly seven-mile
reconstruction project." Florida's Beach and Shore Preservation Act ("the
Act") required officials to conduct a survey and position an erosion control
line ("ECL") to serve as the new boundaries for property owners based
upon the pre-erosion mean high-water line ("MHWL").12 Once estab-
lished, beachfront property owners' common law littoral rights would
cease, and statutory law would concurrently grant those same rights, ex-
cepting the right to accretions and relictions.1 3 The project planned to use
dredging machines to pump submerged sand into the affected areas, and
the venture ultimately restored the beaches to a pre-erosion condition but
7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No.
08-1151).
8. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (majority opinion).
9. Id.
10. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1120 n.16 (Fla. 2008).
The word "littoral" comes from the Latin word "litus," which means "seashore." Id. at 1105 n.3.
11. Save Our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 50-51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
12. Id. at 53; FLA. STAT. §H 161.161(3)-(5), 161.191 (2005).
13. Save our Beaches, Inc., 27 So. 3d at 54; FLA. STAT. §§ 161.191, 161.201. Littoral rights in
Florida include (1) the right to access the water, (2) the right to reasonably use the water, (3) the right
to an unobstructed view of the water, and (4) the right to accretions and relictions. Walton Cnty., 998
So. 2d at 1111. An "accretion" is "the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of land along the shore
or bank of a body of water." Black's Law Dictionary, 34 (8th ed. 2004). A "reliction" is "an increase of
the land by a gradual and imperceptible withdrawal of any body of water." Id. at 1455.
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added an extra seventy-five feet of sandy beach seaward of the old prop-
erty boundaries.14
In other words, the State drove huge pipes into the ocean floor and
pumped sand along the coastline to help prevent more erosions."s Instead
of putting the beaches back in their previous positions, the State went
ahead and pumped additional sand into the damaged areas and set aside
the new beach for the public.16 Essentially, the property owners' ocean-
front real estate would no longer touch the water, and twenty-five yards of
public beach would sit outside their patio doors.17
Shortly after the Department issued its public notice, six beachfront
property owners formed an association titled Stop the Beach Renourish-
ment, Inc. ("the Members") to challenge the upcoming permit, the recent
survey, and the legislation's constitutionality under state law.1 s
On appeal to the Florida District Court, the Members challenged the
Department's order that endorsed the reconstruction project because it
would take away both the right to accretions and the right for the upland to
maintain contact with the water.1 9 The district court reversed the Depart-
ment's order that issued the permit and remanded the case so the Depart-
ment could prove its property interest in the abutting land.2 0 The appellate
court then certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court as to
whether the Act was unconstitutionally applied and consequently deprived
the upland owners of their littoral property rights without just
compensation.21
The Florida Supreme Court re-worded the certified issue and ques-
tioned the statute on its face, which meant that the statute would only be
unconstitutional if "no set of circumstances exist[ed] under which the stat-
ute would be valid."2 2 The high court reversed the district court's decision
and held that the Act was facially constitutional because the common law




18. Save Our Beaches, Inc., 27 So. 3d at 51. Save Our Beach, Inc. was not permitted to appear
before the administrative law judge without more proof that the individuals within the corporation
were beachfront property owners who would be directly affected by the judicial hearing. Id. at 55. In
addition to the Department, Walton County and the City of Destin were active parties. Id. at 48. The
administrative law judge held the permit and survey were proper under state laws, leaving the constitu-
tional challenges for court proceedings. Id. at 51.
19. Id. at 50, 57. "If an authorized beach restoration ... cannot reasonably be accomplished
without the taking of private property, the taking must be made by the requesting authority by eminent
domain proceedings." FLA. STAT. § 161.141 (2005).
20. Save Our Beaches, Inc., 27 So. 3d at 60. The law requires "satisfactory evidence of [a] suffi-
cient upland interest" if a beach restoration project "unreasonably infringe[s] on riparian rights." FLA.
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 18-21.004(3) (2005). "Riparian rights" generally refer to all waterfront property
rights, but "littoral rights" more properly defines those interests which abut the ocean. Walton Cnty. v.
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 n.3 (Fla. 2008).
21. Save Our Beaches, Inc., 27 So. 3d at 60-61.
22. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1105, 1109. The certified question became: "On its face, does the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland owners of littoral rights without
just compensation." Id.
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doctrine of avulsion maintained the property boundary at the pre-hurri-
cane MHWL,23 and the doctrine permitted the public to regain the land it
had lost.24 The court further held that the right to accretions was a contin-
gent future interest that had not yet vested in the upland owners' posses-
sion,25 and the right for the upland to maintain contact with the water was
ancillary to the littoral right to access.26 One of the dissenting justices felt
that the court manipulated the certified question and failed to recognize
that the precedent factor in calling the property rights "littoral" rested
soundly upon the property contacting the water.27
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether
the Florida Supreme Court's decision itself amounted to a "taking" under
the United States Constitution.2 8 Justice Scalia and three others concluded
that the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause applies to judicial decisions
just like it applies to legislative acts because the Constitution focuses on the
government's act of taking without regard to the actor.29 The plurality de-
termined that the Fifth Amendment applies to littoral rights just like it ap-
plies to estates in land, so there was no need to determine whether the right
to accretions was an easement appurtenant or a contingent future interest
under Florida's common law.30
Justices Kennedy, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Ginsburg concluded that it
was improper to discuss whether a judicial decision could amount to a gov-
ernmental taking because the instant case could be resolved without such
an inquiry.31
In the end, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion for a unanimous
Court and affirmed the Florida Supreme Court's decision that the State's
avulsion doctrine applied, holding the judicial decision was not an unconsti-
tutional taking because the project never implicated the right to accre-
tions.3 2 Moreover, the Florida Supreme Court's refusal to expand State
23. Id. at 1116. " 'Avulsion' is the sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to the land by the
action of the water . ." Id. The Florida Supreme Court held there was no difference between a
natural avulsion and a State-created avulsion. Id. at 1115.
24. Id. at 1117. "Under both the Florida Constitution and the common law, the State holds the
lands seaward of the MHWL, including the beaches between the mean high and low water lines, in trust
for the public for the purposes of bathing, fishing, and navigation." Id. at 1109 (citing FLA. CONST., art.
X, § 11).
25. Id. at 1112. The littoral rights to access and use are treated like affirmative easements, and
the other littoral right to an unobstructed view is treated like a negative easement. Id. at 1112 n.10.
26. Id. at 1119-20. The court held the project could produce a wider area of sand beyond the
pre-hurricane condition so long as the State did not unreasonably distance the upland owner from the
water so as to impair her right to access. Id. at 1120 n.16.
27. Id. at 1121, 1124 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
28. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600-01
(2010). The Department claimed the Members could not bring the suit because the corporation did not
own waterfront property itself; moreover, the Department argued the claim was not ripe because the
Members did not ask for just compensation. Id. at 2610. The Court rejected both contentions and held
the claims were not in the Department's previous petition and were consequently not jurisdictional. Id.
29. Id. at 2601. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito joined Justice Scalia's plu-
rality decision with regards to Parts II and III. Id. at 2597.
30. Id. at 2601 n.5.
31. Id. at 2613, 2618.
32. Id. at 2597, 2612-13. Justice Stevens took no part in the Court's decision. Id. at 2614.
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law to include a littoral right to contact would not amount to a taking since
the court plainly upheld the State's established property laws. 3
'PRIb'ATE 1PRrAT -
PJ~~~~j Ia)r--FA
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Public Trust Doctrine
Florida holds its beaches and submerged lands below the MHWL in a
trust for the public's use and enjoyment.3 To be clear, the public has a
right to use the water plus the strip of tideland between the high-water
33. Id. at 2612-13.
34. 1 am grateful to my grandparents, best known as Nanna and Granddaddy, for helping me
create this pictorial expression and for their loving encouragement and advice throughout all of my
endeavors.
35. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11. The "mean high-water line" is "the average reach of the high tide
over the preceding 19 years." Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2598.
2012] 129
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
mark and the low-water line where the tide ebbs and flows throughout the
day.36 Historically, both common and civil law communities used this ar-
rangement to ensure the whole public could use the shorelines on any navi-
gable body of water. Consequently, the trust prohibits Florida from
conveying these lands to private parties unless the State grants only limited
rights that do not materially interfere with the public's use.3 8
At English common law, the Crown held the shoreline and tidal wa-
ters in this type of trust for the entire citizenry, and the same principles
applied throughout the American Colonies.39 The King or Queen could
grant rights to use these lands, but the licenses were always subject to an
overriding public interest in using the waters.4 0 The justification for such
an inherent right was that the ocean and other navigable waterways created
"natural highways" for commerce that no one, not even a prince, should
interrupt.41
After gaining independence, the States held title to these lands in a
trust to promote the general welfare for their citizens. 42 After the States
ratified the United States Constitution and surrendered some of their
rights, these lands remained under State control but also became subject to
federal navigation and interstate commerce laws.43
Florida's tale involves a slightly different story: After negotiating with
Spain, the United States took the Florida territories and held the tidelands
in a trust that would benefit the area's respective society.44 Once Florida
became a state in 1845, it expressly agreed to hold these lands in a public
trust for its citizens in the same manner as the original states. 45 Today, this
trust creates a property boundary at the MHWL that separates the public's
lowland from the private owner's upland.46
B. Littoral Rights
Speaking of private owners, the common law recognized additional
rights for property that abutted navigable water.4 7 These rights are called
"riparian" or "littoral" rights, and some people use the terms interchangea-
bly; however, the term "riparian" refers to land that borders rivers or
streams, while "littoral" refers to land that borders the sea.48 Littoral
rights in Florida include (1) the right to access the water, (2) the right to
reasonably use the water, (3) the right to an unobstructed view of the
36. Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 57 So. 428, 431 (Fla. 1912).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Brickell v. Trammel, 82 So. 221, 226 (Fla. 1919).
40. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 458 (1892).
41. Id.
42. Brickell, 82 So. at 226.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 227.
45. Id. at 226.
46. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2008).
47. Brickell, 82 So. at 227.
48. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1105 n.3.
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water, and (4) the right to accretions and relictions.4 9 These exclusive
rights apply to lands that extend to the MHWL, and they simply reflect the
implied rights necessary for enjoying the oceanfront property.50 Further-
more, littoral rights are considered property rights that "may not be taken
without just compensation and due process of law."" Should the State
proceed to take the land through eminent domain, the government may not
sever the littoral rights from the upland to discount just compensation
calculations.52
Florida recognizes the first two rights-to access and use the water-
as affirmative easements, while the third right-to view the water-exists
as a negative easement." Moreover, these rights are incident to owning
littoral property, regardless of separate acts of creation, and they inherently
run with the land as easements appurtenant. 54 Thus, every littoral property
owner has a present, non-possessory right to enter and use the tidelands
and water, and no one may interrupt the littoral owner's view of the
ocean.5 5
While a previous decision in Florida provided in dictum that the right
to access included a right for the land to maintain contact with the water,
the Florida Supreme Court recently clarified that Florida's law considers
the right to contact ancillary to the right of access. Consequently, the
upland cannot become so disconnected from the shoreline that it would
materially destroy the owner's right to access.s The court vaguely stated,
"[t]here is a point where such a separation would ... [result] in an unconsti-
tutional taking of littoral rights."5
The last right-to accretion and reliction-exists in Florida as a con-
tingent future interest that vests in possession once the accretion or relic-
tion occurs.6 0  An "accretion" is "the gradual and imperceptible
accumulation of land along the shore or bank of a body of water."6 1 A
49. Id. at 1111.
50. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 48
So. 643, 644 (Fla. 1909).
51. Brickell, 82 So. at 227.
52. Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649, 653 (Fla. 1985).
53. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1112. "An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and
use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses author-
ized by the easement." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (2010).
54. Walton Cnty, 998 So. 2d at 1112 n.10; Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 502
(Fla. 1918); Belvedere Dev. Corp., 476 So. 2d at 651-52. Some case law refers to easements as "incorpo-
real hereditaments," which simply suggests the servitude is both non-possessory and devisable; it does
not mean the interest created is non-physical. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW
OF PROPERTY 435-36 (West Group 2000) (1984).
55. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1112.
56. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 936
(Fla. 1987).
57. Walton Cnty, 998 So. 2d at 1119.
58. Id. at 1120 n.16.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1119; Brickell v. Trammel, 82 So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919).
61. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (8th ed. 2004).
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"reliction" is "an increase of the land by a gradual and imperceptible with-
drawal of any body of water."6 2 It is important to note the difference be-
tween accumulated and non-accumulated sediment: The Florida Supreme
Court held all littoral rights were vested property interests, including the
right to already-accumulated alluvion that developed by accretions or relic-
tions.6 A more recent decision clarified the law with regards to the right
to future, non-accumulated alluvion, calling that right a contingent
interest.64
It is well established that State law determines "the nature and extent"
of littoral property rights within the respective state.6 5 Years ago, the
United States Supreme Court wrote in dictum that the right to future, non-
accumulated alluvion was a vested property right based on natural justice,
calling it "the same with that of the owner of a tree to its fruits." 66 It ap-
pears that the Court was merely applying State law to the issue presentedj
but the doctrine of increase reasoning remains persuasive to some jurists.6 8
Since that decision in 1874, some courts have disregarded the language and
said, "We cannot think that the court meant to announce the doctrine that
the right to alluvion becomes a vested right before such alluvion actually
exists. "69
Nonetheless, the point for now is that State law defines its own littoral
rights, and if the State recognizes accretion as a vested right, then the
United States Supreme Court likewise recognizes it as valuable property
that may only be taken pursuant to the Constitution.o
Moving forward, Florida justifies the littoral right to accretion and re-
liction in the following manner:
There are four reasons for the doctrine of accretion: (1) De
minimis non curat lex; (2) he who sustains the burden of
losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of waters
ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accre-
tion; (3) it is in the interest of the community that all land
62. Id. at 1455.
63. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 936
(Fla. 1987).
64. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1112, 1119.
65. Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R. Comm'n of Wis., 274 U.S. 651, 655 (1927); Webb v. Giddens, 82
So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 1955); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2597 (2010).
66. Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68-69 (1874). This concept reflects the doctrine
of increase in property law based on the idea that "the offspring of our cattle ... are esteem'd our
property, even before possession." THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 165 (Foundation Press 2007) (quoting DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE
327 (David Fate Norton & Mary J. Norton eds., 2000) (1739)).
67. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d at 941 (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 937.
69. Maunalua Bay Beach Ohana v. State, 222 P.3d 441, 460 (Haw. Ct. App. 2009) (citing W. Pac.
R.R. Co. v. S. Pac. Co., 151 F. 376, 399 (9th Cit. 1907)).
70. Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1870).
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have an owner and, for convenience, the riparian is the cho-
sen one; (4) the necessity for preserving the riparian right of
access to the water.n
Furthermore, alluvion, or additional land, that forms along the shore-
line has historically gone to the upland owner if it accumulated gradually.7 2
Florida does not distinguish between natural and artificial accretions unless
the upland owner caused the accumulation, which would effectively allow a
private owner to take public land." For example, the State built a jetty in
Board of Trustees v. Sand Key Associates that helped increase the amount
of natural accretions, and the court held that the upland owner had a
vested right to the sediment.7 4 Ultimately, the justification for a right to
accretion and reliction rests upon natural justice and the quid pro quo that
the upland owner gets for taking on the equal risk of losing property if the
water creeps inland.
C. The Doctrine of Avulsion
Unlike accretions and relictions, an "avulsion is the sudden or percep-
tible loss of or addition to land by the action of the water."76 The differ-
ence rests upon whether the change in the land is a "sudden or violent
action of the elements, perceptible while in progress."" Should an avul-
sion occur, all property boundaries in the affected areas remain the same as
they were before the avulsion stirred the lands." Without the doctrine,
property owners and title recorders would face serious challenges in docu-
menting the changes to the topography."
After the avulsion, the property owner who lost her land may reclaim
it within a reasonable amount of time.8 0 For instance, the Florida Supreme
Court held it was lawful for riparian owners on a lake to take it upon them-
selves to lower the water to its pre-avulsion level.8 Likewise, the State has
71. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So.
2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1973). De minimis non curat lex means "trifles with which the law does not con-
cern itself." Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla. 2008). In
the case at hand, Florida's Supreme Court held none of these four reasons applied to the Act because
the critically eroded beaches were much more than trifles, the reconstruction lowered the upland
owner's risk of losing property through future erosions, the ECL provided a clear property boundary,
and the Act expressly protects the littoral owner's right to access. Id.
72. Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 66-68 (1874). The Court found similar laws in
the works of Justinian, Napoleon, English common law, and early American case law. Id.
73. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934,
937-38 (Fla. 1987) (citing Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d at 212).
74. Id. at 938.
75. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *261-62.
76. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1113. Hurricanes are expressly recognized as avulsive events.
Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1970).
77. 7 J. A. SIMPSON & E. S. C. WEINER, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 173 (Clarendon
Press 1989) (citing Schwartzstein v. B.B. Bathing Park, 197 N.Y.S. 490 (N.Y. App. Div. 1922)).
78. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1114.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1117.
81. Florida v. Fla. Nat'l Props., Inc., 338 So. 2d 13, 17 (Fla. 1976).
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a right to reclaim the public's land after an avulsion occurs, even if the land
was once submerged but is now exposed.82
Furthermore, Florida does not distinguish between artificial and natu-
ral avulsions." In Martin v. Busch, the Florida Supreme Court determined
that the State had no authority to convey title to lands below the mean
high-water line on a navigable lake. The plaintiff claimed that he owned
the swamplands to a point that extended below Lake Okeechobee's high-
water line based on his predecessor's deed of conveyance. The court was
unconvinced that the State had authority at the time to grant such a con-
veyance, and the court held that Florida's resolution to lower the lake in a
perceptible manner did not change the fact that the State would still own
the land after the water receded." In a later case, the Florida Supreme
Court used this reasoning to conclude the drainage project was an artificial
avulsion that trumped any littoral right to reliction. 7
D. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act
In 1961, Florida's legislature passed a law that allowed the State to
reconstruct eroded beaches along the coastline because the shores were
"vitally important to the economy and the well-being of the people of Flor-
ida."" In its 1970 amendment, the legislature passed a law without the
governor's approval, explaining that the State would need to set an ECL
based on the MHWL and the engineers' practical needs to clarify the prop-
erty boundary. 89
Today, the statute establishes that Florida's Board of Trustees of the
Internal Improvement Trust Fund holds title to the lands below the
MHWL on navigable bodies of water in a trust for the public's benefit.90
The legislature delegated its authority to determine which beaches are criti-
cally eroded to the Department of Environmental Protection.91 If a local
municipality determines its beaches have reached a serious point of decay,
the governing body applies to the Department for funding.9 2 If the Depart-
ment approves the application for sand deposits and nourishment, 93 the
government conducts a survey to find the MHWL, 94 and then the State sets
an ECL based on that old boundary, giving due consideration for the pro-
ject's needs. 95
82. Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 838-39.
83. Id. (citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 284 (Fla. 1927)).
84. Martin, 112 So. at 284.
85. Id. at 283.
86. Id. at 284.
87. Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 838-39.
88. H. B. 1921, 1961 Leg., Reg. Sess. at *437 (Fla. 1961).
89. H. B. 155, 1970 Leg., Reg. Sess. at *873-76 (Fla. 1970).
90. FLA. STAT. § 253.12(1) (2005).
91. Id. § 161.088.
92. Id. § 161.141.
93. Id. § 161.021(3)-(4).
94. Id. § 161.141.
95. Id. § 161.161(5).
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Once the State files the ECL survey with the county records holder,
the ECL becomes the new property boundary between the upland and low-
land.9 6 Thus, the common law right to accretion and reliction ceases to
apply," but the Act expressly protects the other littoral rights to access,
use, and an unobstructed view.98
A few caveats remain for these renourishment projects: First, if the
State cannot reasonably perform the reconstruction without impairing the
upland owner's littoral rights, the government can only move forward
through eminent domain proceedings. 99 Second, the State has two years to
finish the project or else the common law rights return, and the ECL termi-
nates."oo Finally, the State has the right to come back and fix the beach if
the erosion continues, but action must be taken within one year.' 0 1
E. The Takings Clause
The United States Constitution provides: "Nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.""0 2 This limitation on
the government's eminent domain powers originally applied to the federal
government, but the United States Supreme Court incorporated the provi-
sion to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due pro-
cess clause. 0 3
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause has four core parts that de-
serve separate attention: First, this constitutional provision only applies to
"private property." 04 Florida recognizes vested littoral rights as private
property rights, 0 ' and the United States Supreme Court likewise considers
the rights valuable property interests that cannot be "capriciously de-
stroyed or impaired." 0 6
Second, the government may "take" private property in ways beyond
the word's plain meaning: A state may "take" property when the govern-
ment uses its own property in a manner that seriously damages another's
land.10' In Pumpelly v. Green Bay, the defendants received authority to
build a dam and raise a lake's water level. 0 8 As a result, water flooded the
plaintiff's nearby land, continually leaving sand deposits and destroying the
96. Id. § 161.191(1).
97. Id. § 161.191(2).
98. Id. § 161.201.
.99. Id. § 161.141.
100. Id. § 161.211(1). The same happens if the State begins the project but takes no action for a
six-month period, and the same happens if the State fails to maintain the ECL. Id.
101. Id. § 161.211(2).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
103. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897).
104. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
105. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 936
(Fla. 1987).
106. Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1870).
107. Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177-78 (1872).
108. Id. at 171.
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terrain.'09 The Court held that the destruction amounted to a "taking" be-
cause it effectively destroyed the land's usefulness. 110
Thus far, the Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment only applies to
the executive and legislative branches; only a plurality of Justices in Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. would impose the limitation on the judici-
ary."' The plurality relied on Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beck-
with that held Florida took property within the meaning of the Takings
Clause when it recharacterized private property as public property. 1 12
In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., a business agreed to purchase an
insolvent corporation, and the parties proceeded through the state court
system to properly distribute the funds among creditors who held a "prop-
erty right to their respective portions."11 3 Pursuant to state law, the court's
clerk deposited the funds in an interest-bearing account and eventually
used the extra income as government revenue.1 14 In Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc., Florida's high court arguably went against precedent and
defined the deposited fund as temporary "public money" from which the
State "[took] only what it create[d]."" 5 The United States Supreme Court
unanimously disapproved and held that "[n]either the Florida Legislature
by statute, nor the Florida courts by judicial decree, may accomplish the
result the county seeks simply by recharacterizing the principal as 'public
money' ... without compensation .... [It] is the very kind of thing that the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment was meant to prevent."116
The third element in the Takings Clause limits the government's power
to take private property to situations where the taking is for a "public
use.""'7 It is well established in American jurisprudence that the govern-
ment cannot take property from one individual and convey it to another
private party."1 s Over the years, the public use requirement has expanded
to include economic development plans, even when the land is not open to
the entire public's physical use.'1 9 Moreover, the extent to which the gov-
ernment may take private property rests in the legislative branch's
discretion. 120
Finally, the government must pay "just compensation" for the prop-
erty it takes.121 The goal is to put the owner "in as good a position .. . as he
would have occupied if his property had not been taken."122 Moreover, the
109. Id. at 167 (syllabus).
110. Id. at 181.
111. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).
112. Id. (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980)).
113. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc., 449 U.S. at 157, 160.
114. Id. at 162-63.
115. Id. at 163.
116. Id. at 164.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
118. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984).
119. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-79 (2005).
120. Id. at 475.
121. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
122. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373 (1943).
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compensation should be measured at fair market value, which is "what a
willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller." 123
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
It seems necessary to repeat what the Fifth Amendment says: "Nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." 124 Florida recognizes vested littoral rights as private property, so the
Court was quick to place this issue within the scope of the Takings
Clause.125 Moreover, the Act itself expressly arranges for the public to
physically use any land seaward of the MHWL.126 So, the Court was only
left with two issues: (a) Whether a judicial decision could "take" these
property rights such that the Fifth Amendment required "just compensa-
tion" for the owners, and, if so, (b) whether the Florida Supreme Court's
decision actually took away any of the Members' vested littoral rights.
A. Could a Judicial Decision Amount to a "Taking" Under the
Fifth Amendment?
1. Justice Scalia's Plurality1 27
Four Justices concluded that the Takings Clause protects private prop-
erty from any "governmental actor," including decisions from judicial
branches. 128 The plurality reasoned that the Fifth Amendment focuses on
the act of taking and was unlike other portions of the Constitution where
the text specifically mentions actors.12 9 Perhaps common sense suggests
that "[i]t would be absurd to allow a State to do by judicial decree what the
Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat." 30
The plurality explained that the Takings Clause has expanded to pre-
vent activities beyond "the classic taking" to activities that accomplish the
same result:13' The government may not regulate property to the extent it
becomes inversely condemned,132 use property in a way that destroys all of
its economic benefits,13 3 or even force physical occupations without just
compensation. 13 4
123. Id. at 374.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
125. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2598 (2010).
126. FLA. STAT. § 253.12(1) (2005).
127. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion. Stop the
Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2601 (plurality opinion).
128. Id.
129. Id. The Court cited U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 1 for examples of where the
Constitution focuses on the specific actor. Id.
130. Id. (citing Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1211-12 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
131. Id. Traditionally, a legislature may transfer property to another party for public use under
eminent domain laws so long as the State pays just compensation to the owner. See id. at 2613 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
132. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
133. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
134. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
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Analogous to the situation at hand, the Court previously held in
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. that recharacterizing private property as
public money likewise constitutes a taking within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment.1 3 5  Here, the test is whether the State, through whatever
branch of its government, "declares that what was once an established right
of private property no longer exists." 136  Thus, the Members needed to
prove that the Florida Supreme Court's decision to uphold the Act effec-
tively took away a property right that previously existed.
The Department argued that federal courts do not have enough
knowledge about substantive state laws to effectively handle these situa-
tions, proposing that such an expansion to the judiciary would deny state
courts the flexibility they need in deciding complex issues. 38 However, the
plurality explained that the Fifth Amendment would be useless if the fed-
eral courts could not make such state law determinations, and there is
nothing to distinguish a court's need for flexibility in overturning prior de-
cisions from a legislature's need for flexibility in revising the common law
through statutes.139
The Department further contended that a judicial takings theory
would force federal courts to act as appellate tribunals and review "final
state-court judgments," contravening the district courts' limited authority
to hear cases over which they have subject matter jurisdiction.'4 0 Yet, the
plurality explained that the available procedures would not create such a
predicament: After a judicial decision in a lower court allegedly took the
private property right, the party could then appeal to the State supreme
court for review, and afterwards the United States Supreme Court could
grant or deny certiorari.' 41 If certiorari were denied, the claim would be
precluded from being brought in federal court because the issue would be
135. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980).
136. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (plurality opinion).
137. Id. at 2608.
138. Id. at 2609. The Department also argued that the test for whether a judicial decision took
private property should depend on whether the decision had "no fair and substantial basis," but Justice
Scalia remarked that such a test would yield the same result. Id. The Members proposed the test
should be for a "sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of relevant precedents." Id. at
2610. Justice Stewart suggested this approach thirty years ago in a concurring opinion that supported a
judicial takings theory. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). How-
ever, Justice Scalia explains that the focus should be on whether the property right was previously
established and not whether there is precedent for the court's decision. Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia reasons that one person might seek relief and
win under Justice Stewart's test if no precedent supported the decision, but the next person who seeks
relief would lose because precedent would have been established after the court ruled on the first's
person's claims. Id.
139. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2610 (plurality opinion).
140. Id at 2609; see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332 (2006).
141. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion).
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res judicata.14 2 If a person was not a party to the state court claim, then the
individual could challenge the decision in federal court. 14 3
2. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence'"
Justice Kennedy felt that it was unnecessary to develop a judicial tak-
ings theory so long as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
adequately protects property owners from state court decisions that alter
property rights.145 Moreover, eminent domain exists as a "vast governmen-
tal power" that the executive and legislative branches monitor to provide
for public policy demands, and it is through these branches' political capac-
ities that they remain directly accountable to the electorate should the gov-
ernment abuse its power.146 Justice Kennedy also warns that the plurality's
theory might indirectly recognize a judicial power to take property (so long
as the owner receives just compensation), which would contravene the plu-
rality's goal of limiting a court's ability.14 7
If the test Justice Scalia proposes asks whether a judicial decision takes
away an established property right, instead of asking whether just compen-
sation was paid, then a more proper analysis rests under the Due Process
Clause than the Takings Clause.' 48 After all, courts allocate property rights
on a regular basis when they impose liabilities in nuisance claims, so prop-
erty owners should always anticipate some changes in their rights.1 49 If the
judiciary goes too far and eliminates a property right, then the owner could
appeal the decision on the grounds that she was deprived of property with-
out procedural or substantive due process.1 50
142. Id.
143. Id. The district court would have authority to hear such a claim based on original subject
matter jurisdiction under FED. R. Crv. P. § 1331 because the Fifth Amendment guarantees just compen-
sation if the State takes private property for public use. See Lenoir v. Porters Creek Watershed Dist.,
586 F.2d 1081, 1095 (6th Cir. 1978).
144. Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Kennedy's concurrence. Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 2613, 2618. Justice Kennedy joined parts I, IV, and V, concluding that Florida's deci-
sion did not deprive the Members of any private property rights. Id. at 2613. The plurality criticized
Justice Kennedy's decision because he failed to establish a standard or even recognize that a judicial
taking could occur. Id. at 2604 (plurality opinion).
146. Id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy admits it is not clear how the Foun-
ders understood the Takings Clause as it relates to the judicial branch, but he suggests that the clause
applied to classic eminent domain proceedings, where such power was solely vested in the legislative
branch. Id. at 2616. Justice Scalia agreed that the founders did not envision a judicial takings theory
because when the Founders wrote the Constitution, "courts had not power to 'change' the common
law"; however, it should not matter "what they envisioned but what they wrote." Id. at 2606 (plurality
opinion). Because judges now have the power to overturn the common law, it seems imperative to
review the decisions that potentially violate citizens' private property rights under the Fifth Amend-
ment. Id.
147. Id. at 2614-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In other words, a jurist might assume the power to
take away private property rights and feel more comfortable with the decision if the State would then
be required to pay just compensation. Id. at 2616. Justice Scalia disagrees and says it is the plurality
who would limit the judiciary from taking private property while Justice Kennedy's opinion "insists that
judges cannot be so limited." Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
148. Id. at 2614-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2615.
150. Id. at 2613.
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Justice Kennedy concluded with practical considerations that he warns
the plurality should consider before developing a judicial takings theory.'
The concurrence suggests that a majority of these cases would spring from
a property owner's claim against the government for inversely condemning
her property. 1 52 The only remedy would be damages at law (i.e. just com-
pensation) because "[e]quitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged
taking of private property for public use . . . when a suit for compensation
can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking."153 If res
judicata would not prevent the plaintiff from bringing a new claim against
the judicial decision, then the only remedy would be to remand the case to
the lower court for it to either rescind its decision or pay just
compensation.154
However, Justice Scalia explained that a procedural due process analy-
sis in such cases would improperly impose the federal government's separa-
tion-of-powers principles on the sovereign states.1 5 Chief Justice Roberts
illustrated this reasoning during oral arguments when he pointed out that
some states elect their judges directly instead of using an appointment pro-
cess like the federal government.1 5 6 Even more, a judicial candidate could
potentially campaign to change a particular law, which would be no differ-
ent from the political role that legislative and executive branches
embrace. 5 7
Furthermore, Justice Scalia argues that substantive due process is an
improper framework to prevent a judicial taking because "[w]here a partic-
ular Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional pro-
tection' against a particular sort of government behavior, 'that
Amendment, not the more generalized notion of "substantive due pro-
cess," must be the guide for analyzing these claims.' "" The plurality
questions how Justice Kennedy's practical considerations would be any dif-
ferent under a Due Process Clause analysis, suggesting that the proper
remedy would simply be for the Court to reverse the state court's holding
that the Act can be applied. 159
151. Id. at 2616-18.
152. Id. at 2617. Justice Kennedy disagrees that res judicata would bar a new claim because the
party would not have lost a property right until after the lower court's decision. Id.
153. Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
156. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2952 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
157. Id.
158. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (quoting Albright
v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)). Justice Scalia also contends that substantive due process should not
be a method for protecting economic liberties. Id. The plurality suggests that Justice Kennedy might
like to use a substantive due process analysis because it would preserve the Court's open-ended power
to decide whether or not property has been taken in future cases: "The great attraction of Substantive
Due Process as a substitute for more specific constitutional guarantees is that it never means never-
because it never means anything precise." Id. at 2608.
159. Id. at 2607.
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3. Justice Breyer's Concurrence1 6 0
Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Kennedy that it was not appropriate
to discuss whether a judicial taking occurred in the case at hand because it
was clear that the Florida Supreme Court did not take a private property
right. 161 Furthermore, he worried that the plurality's decision would open
a floodgate of federal trial courts deciding substantive issues of state law
with little deference to state court opinions.162
Justice Scalia countered that Justice Breyer's approach seemed impos-
sible because he decided that the state court did not take a private property
right without first determining whether a state court could take a private
property right.'6 Justice Scalia compared the analysis to the infamous
question, "How much wood would a woodchuck chuck if a woodchuck
could chuck wood?" 164 Furthermore, Justice Scalia explained that the fed-
eral courts do not give deference to state court decisions that are appealed
on federal constitutional challenges. 16 5 Instead, the federal courts give high
deference to the state court's determination that a property right did not
exist before the decision.166
In sum, four Justices were willing to expand the Takings Clause to judi-
cial decisions to the extent it already applies to the executive and legislative
branches, and four Justices refused to allow such an expansion, leaving the
issue open for future determination.167 It is interesting to note that Justice
Kagan, who was then the United States Solicitor General, filed a brief as
amicus curiae and strongly opposed the notion that a judicial decision
could amount to a "taking.""'s
B. Did the Florida Supreme Court's Decision "Take" Private
Property Rights?
Let's get back to the sandy beaches. After all the hustle and bustle
over whether a judicial branch could "take" private property, the Court
unanimously held that the Florida Supreme Court's decision did not
amount to a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 169 Instead, two property
rights in Florida simply overlapped and caused some confusion: (a) The
160. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Breyer's concurrence. Id.
161. Id. Justice Breyer suggests the Court should "confine ourselves to deciding only what is
necessary to the disposition of the immediate case." Id. (quoting Whitehouse v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 349
U.S. 366, 373 (1955)). However, Justice Scalia argues that the Court routinely establishes a test only to
find that the issue at hand fails to meet it; moreover, Justice Breyer's examples of instances when the
Court refused to give a precise standard arose only when there were competing standards among lower
courts. Id. at 2602-03 (plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 2619 (Breyer. J., concurring).
163. Id. at 2602-04 (plurality opinion).
164. Id. at 2603.
165. Id. at 2608 n.9.
166. Id.
167. Justice Stevens did not participate in the opinion. Id. at 2613.
168. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 9, Stop the Beach
Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2952 (No. 08-1151).
169. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2613, 2618 (majority opinion).
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State always has a right to fill its submerged lands so long as the govern-
ment acts in accordance with the public trust and does not interfere with
the upland owners' littoral rights; (b) anytime an avulsion occurs, the prop-
erty boundaries between the upland owner and the State remain fixed even
if the avulsion interrupts the abutting land's contact with the shoreline. 7 0
It was clear that the State had a right to reclaim its engulfed lands up
to the MHWL after the avulsive hurricanes.17 1 The issue became whether
Florida's law made an exception when the State caused an artificial avul-
sion by dumping the extra sand that separated the upland from the shore-
line.172 It appeared Florida law did not make an exception after reviewing
Martin because the State analogously drained a lake in Martin and retained
title to the uncovered lands, which separated the upland owner from the
water line.173
Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court held that there was no inde-
pendent right for the littoral owner's land to touch the water outside of the
right to access, and the United States Supreme Court held that this decision
was consistent with Florida law.174 The Members argued that they had a
right for the upland to contact the water based on the holding in Sand Key
Associates. 17 However, the Court held that the discussion in Sand Key
Associates existed only as dictum and conflicted with legal precedent in
Florida. 1 6 Just to be clear, the Members did not claim the new ECL was
different from the historical MHWL.1 77 The Court said that if the new line
was upland of the old one, then it would amount to a taking and would
require just compensation.1 7 8
Coupling the State's present right to uncover submerged land with lit-
toral owners' contingent interest in future accretions, it appeared the latter
was subordinate.179 In other words, the Members failed to prove that the
upland owners' littoral rights were superior to the public's right-to-fill
under the avulsion doctrine.8 o If there was no accreted sediment, then the
littoral owner had nothing to claim a right over, regardless of the State's
170. Id. at 2611.
171. Id. The Members argued that they had a vested property right to future accretions based on
precedent in Sand Key Associates, but the Court found that Sand Key Associates discussed the matter in
dictum because the case there involved already-accumulated accretions. Id. at 2612. Furthermore, the
holding in Sand Key Associates refused to apply Martin to their circumstances because the drainage
project in Martin involved an avulsive event, which was notably different from the jetty. Bd. of Trs. of
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 940-41 (Fla. 1987).
172. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. 130 S. Ct. at 2612 (majority opinion).
173. Id. at 2611-12.
174. Id. at 2612-13.
175. Id. at 2612.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2600 n.2, 2612.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 2611.
180. Id. at 2610-11. The Court said that the Members' argument positioned the burden on the
wrong party; the Members needed to show the Court that the owners' littoral rights were superior to
the public's right-to-fill. Id.
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interference with the boundary lines."" Consequently, the Florida Su-
preme Court's decision did not take away the right to accretion and instead
yielded to stare decisis in Martin.182
In addition to these central arguments, the Members contended that
the Act itself replaced owners' littoral rights with inferior statutory ver-
sions. But the Members failed to show how littoral owners had anything
less under the statute than they did at common law because the avulsion
doctrine would apply either way.18 3
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court held that the Florida
court's decision did not take away any private property rights because the
State's avulsion doctrine superseded the littoral right to accretion; moreo-
ver, the right to contact never independently existed in Florida outside of
the right to access,184 which the Act expressly protected. 85 The Court sym-
pathized that "the Members' property has been deprived of character (and
value) as oceanfront property by the State's artificial creation of an avul-
sion. "186 But no matter how wrong the boundary interference seemed, the
Court felt it was not in a position to change Florida's substantive property
laws.1 s7
V. ANALYSIS
Although the Justices' line-drawing divergence bestows an alluring
topic for discussion, what seems more remarkable is the Justices' unani-
mous pronouncement about the substantive property laws at issue. This
analysis tunnels beyond the hypothetical consequences that this case entails
for the Takings Clause and engages in a balancing test based on the State's
nuisance laws." While this Part draws on Florida's common law, the rea-
soning applies to the other twenty-two states with oceanfront property and
virtually any state with property that borders navigable lakes or rivers. Fi-
nally, this Part tackles the last littoral right to accretion and attempts to
further develop this this peculiar entitlement's status under the law.
The Court restrained itself from making too broad a ruling and ob-
served, "Perhaps state-created avulsions ought to be treated differently . . .
[, and] there might be different interpretations of Martin and other Florida
property-law cases that would prevent this arguably odd result, [but] we are
181. Id. at 2612.
182. Id. It is worthy to note that the Florida Supreme Court's decision never mentioned Martin in
its decision. Id. Instead, the court relied on other cases to show "that affected property owners can
return their property to its pre-hurricane status," which meant that the Act was facially constitutional.
Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1117 (Fla. 2008).
183. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13 n.12 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 2612-13.
185. FLA. STAT. § 161.201 (2005).
186. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2612
187. Id.
188. Professor Timothy Mulvaney noted that an interesting question remains unresolved for this
case in the Takings Clause context: How is the cable line in Loretto different from the anchoring sand
here? Timothy Mulvaney, Uncertainties Remain for Judicial Takings Theory, 24:6 ABA PROBATE &
PROPERTY 14 (2010).
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not free to adopt them."189 What's more, the Florida Supreme Court cited
to binding authority on nuisance laws and admitted, "the State is not free
to unreasonably distance the upland property from the water by creating as
much dry land between the upland property and the water as it pleases."' 90
Coupling the United States Supreme Court's restraint with the Florida Su-
preme Court's careful admission, this Note suggests that a more tangible
analysis for the Members' dilemma rests in the property laws of nuisance.
Across jurisdictions, and probably in Florida as well,' 91 the law gener-
ally defines a nuisance as a substantial and unreasonable interference "with
the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his land." 192 In cases of intentional
interferences, the inquiry turns to whether the substantial harm is
unreasonable. 1 9 3
A. The Balancing Test
The test is whether "the gravity of harm" that the littoral owner suffers
in losing direct contact with the water "outweighs the utility of the actor's
conduct" in protecting the public shoreline from future erosions by artifi-
cially creating new beaches.194 Regrettably, the short answer in this case is
probably no, but a time may come when that answer is yes. Nuisance laws
use a governance theory to protect people's use and enjoyment of their
property from harmful neighboring interferences. 19 5 Here, the neighbors
are very simply the Members and the State; the former has littoral rights
and the latter protects the public's rights to the seashore.1 96
189. Id. at 2612. One possible distinction between Martin and the case at hand is that Martin
involved a non-tidal lake. Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 283 (Fla. 1927). Here, the oceanfront is clearly
tidal and arguably involves much more drastic changes to the MHWL, but this Note leaves that policy
discussion for Florida's legislators.
190. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1120 n.16 (Fla. 2008)
(citing Game & Fresh Water Comm'n v. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1981); Webb v. Giddens, 82
So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1955)). The federal government faces a similar limitation in the context of lawful
conduct that allegedly causes a nuisance. Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914) ("We
deem the true rule, under the 5th Amendment, as under state constitutions containing a similar prohibi-
tion, to be that while the legislature may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not
confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking
of private property for public use.") (citations omitted).
191. See Jones v. Trawick, 70 So. 2d 785, 787 (Fla. 1954) (en banc).
192. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 54, at 414.
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822(a) (1979).
194. Id. § 826(a); see Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535, 536 (Fla. 1917).
195. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1956). There is a fundamental difference in the
government's ability to regulate public nuisances with the power to take property through eminent
domain. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 510 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The former
affords a public benefit without compensation because the property use is so injurious to the public, and
the latter permits the government to take property from an innocent owner for a public use so long as it
provides just compensation. Id. The regulation turns into a taking when the State deprives the prop-
erty of "all economically beneficial use," which depends on whether the "nature of the owner's estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). However, the Members were not claiming the artificial avulsions
were public nuisances, and the State was not claiming the Members used their property in a manner
injurious to the public.
196. Littoral owners may bring claims for public nuisances, from which they incur a special injury,
or for private nuisances directly. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 192-93.
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The first step in this balancing process is to examine the gravity of
harm to littoral owners. The second step is to look at the utility of the
beach renourishment project. Then, the last step is to balance the two uses
to determine if the renourishment project is reasonable under the
circumstances.
1. Gravity of Harm to Littoral Owners
The gravity of harm here is relatively low because these rights are lim-
ited to particular purposes that remain virtually intact after the renourish-
ment project. Littoral ownership creates a rare breed of property
entitlements: These rights make common sense because they arise natu-
rally,197 but the law grapples with their definition and often struggles with
their application.1 9 8 Florida treats the non-possessory littoral rights to ac-
cess, use, and view like servitudes because that is the closest analogy for
natural rights that arise incident to owning oceanfront property, particu-
larly because the public has a neighboring interest in the shoreline. The
public land, through the trust, represents the servient tenement that grants
an easement appurtenant for those three particular purposes to littoral
owners, whose land represents the dominant estate.
Thus, the Members have the right to prevent people from obstructing
these irrevocable rights, and the rights impose a correlative duty on the
world, including the State, not to interfere.199 Likewise, the public has a
concurrent interest in using the shoreline and waters,2 00 so this right im-
poses a reciprocal duty on the world, including littoral owners, not to
interfere.
On its face, the gravity of harm here seems nominal because statutory
law immediately protects these common law rights once the Department
sets an ECL.2 01 But this case presents a new situation because the State
has added sand and distanced the upland owner from the shoreline. Al-
though the Members still have a right to use the water, their ability to ac-
cess the water and their unobstructed view has nevertheless changed. Even
so, it does not seem very harmful for the Members to walk another twenty-
five yards to reach the ocean, and the distance hardly requires binoculars to
197. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 54, at 440.
198. A great deal of controversy surrounded the additional right for the upland to contact the
water; after all, littoral rights exist because the land extends to the MHWL and borders a navigable
waterway. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 48
So. 643, 644 (Fla. 1909). However, a practical look at the situation makes the discussion more palat-
able: The property deeds for littoral owners in Florida describe the land extending to the MHWL, and
without that boundary the property would have no incidental littoral rights. If the State needs to con-
duct a renourishment project. officials record an ECL survey that attaches to the deed, and positive law
immediately protects the three littoral rights to access, use, and view. What's more, the State has two
years to finish the project or the ECL terminates, and the common law littoral rights return; if the
beach erodes again, the State has one year to fix the problem. FLA. STAT. § 161.211 (2005). It appears
crucial here to allow statutory law to protect what the common law, by definition, cannot.
199. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS As APPLIED IN JUDI-
CIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 36-38 (Yale University Press 1919).
200. Lake Islands, 407 So. 2d at 192.
201. FLA. STAT. § 161.201.
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see the shoreline. As a result, it appears that the gravity of harm to the
Members in this case is relatively low.
2. Utility of the Beach Renourishment Project
The State has a constitutional duty to safeguard the aesthetic beaches
because they serve a vital role in the economy, 202 and the renourishment
project protects the public's interest in using the seashore for its daily en-
joyment. So, it seems the utility here is rather high because the project
helps protect these beaches from harsh erosion or ultimate depletion. Fur-
thermore, the public trust doctrine sets forth fairly clear property rights for
Florida's citizens to communally use and enjoy the tidal waters.2 03 Before
the renourishment project, the public could only use the stretch of beach
between high tide and low tide.2 04 From personal experience, people use
the shoreline to walk their pets, go for a morning jog, or play around in the
waves.
Here, the State is likely spending millions of dollars to fix a nearly
seven-mile area to keep these eroded beaches from disappearing. The ad-
ditional sand is necessary to keep the erosion from reoccurring too soon;
even all of the sand here is only projected to last for six years.20 5 The
Members probably felt that the State was just trying to open more public
beaches to promote tourism, but the Department's hidden intent is beyond
the scope of this analysis.
Looking only at the State's conduct, it seems that there is a high level
of utility in the project's renourishment plans. Local officials cannot sit by
and allow hurricane after hurricane to ravish the beaches to a point of no
return. Likewise, the State cannot reasonably expect private property own-
ers to be able to afford, much less repeatedly organize, their own beach
reconstruction projects. Coupling the State's constitutional duty to protect
the shoreline with its well-structured procedure to reconstruct eroded
beaches, it appears that the utility of the project is relatively high.
3. Reasonableness
The renourishment project at hand seems like a reasonable use of the
property, but future projects could very well become unreasonable if they
go too far. Florida precedent holds that "[t]he law of private nuisance is a
law of degree; it generally turns on the factual question whether the use to
which the property is put is a reasonable use under the circumstances."206
Florida courts determine reasonableness based on the Second Restatement
202. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 7(a).
203. White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446, 449 (Fla. 1939).
204. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 48
So. 643, 645 (Fla. 1909).
205. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2952 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
206. Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 555 (Fla. 1956).
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of Torts: "An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and en-
joyment of land is unreasonable if the gravity of the harm outweighs the
utility of the actor's conduct ....
For instance, a riparian owner in Webb v. Giddens owned property on
the arm of a lake where he rented boats.208 The State replaced an old
bridge with a flat road that destroyed the owner's ability to access the large
part of the lake via boat.209 The court found that this filled-in culvert was
an unreasonable interference with the riparian owner's use of the lake.210
For another example, the State passed an ordinance in Game & Fresh
Water Fish Commission v. Lake Islands, Ltd. to prevent boating over Lake
lamonia during the duck season's hunting hours.211 The lake was unusually
low, and some owners could not reach their property without an airboat,21 2
so the court found this ordinance unreasonable as it applied to riparian
owners because it interfered with their right to access.213
Now, the underlying concern here is probably that this new public
beach in the Members' back yard will attract loud parties, smoky
campfires, or crowds of people, which in turn will diminish the property's
value compared to nearby real estate. The Members' feel like they bar-
gained for a different type of real estate-they paid for property that di-
rectly abutted the water-and perhaps their attorney Mr. Safriet put it best
when he said that the Florida Supreme Court's decision turned "oceanfront
property into oceanview property."214
But oceanfront property owners have always faced potential annoy-
ances along the shoreline such as noisy jet skis or even floating hot dog
stands as some Justices suggested in oral arguments.215 The potential
problems that this new public beach may bring seem endless, but their solu-
tion rests in either police enforcement or equitable injunctions if the an-
noyances become unlawful nuisances. To put the issue into focus for this
analysis, the Act and the court's decision simply permitted the State to
dredge and pump sand; they did not permit a free-for-all for constant inter-
ferences with property rights.
Again, the question here is whether "the gravity of harm" that the
littoral owner suffers in losing direct contact with the water and the right to
accretion "outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct" in protecting the
public shoreline from future erosions by artificially creating a seventy-five
feet avulsion. Probably not. The Members retain statutory rights to access,
use, and view the water, and even though the new beach changes the ability
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 826(a) (1979); see Cason v. Fla. Power Co., 76 So. 535,
536 (Fla. 1917).
208. Webb v. Giddens, 82 So. 2d 743, 744 (Fla. 1955).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 745.
211. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comm'n v. Lake Islands, Ltd., 407 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 1981).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 191.
214. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2952 (2010) (No. 08-1151).
215. Id. at 9-10.
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to access and view the ocean, the effect is minimal. Conversely, the State
has a constitutional duty to protect the public's interest in using the sea-
shore and has created a systematic procedure to reconstruct the damaged
beaches.
Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a point of unreasonableness for the
artificial avulsions because the economic influences tend to negate any
minimal effect on the littoral owner. The renourishment projects and arti-
ficial beaches are only temporary,216 and if the erosion continues, the State
has one year to replenish the area, or else the ECL terminates and the
common law rights return.217
That is not to say that renourishment projects and artificial beaches
may never reach an excessive point comparable to the road in Giddens or
the no-boat ordinance in Lake Islands. Situations comparable to Giddens
might include anything that obstructs the littoral owner's ability to walk to
the beach, such as high seawalls or lattice fences that help anchor the new
sand. Perhaps three hundred feet is too much sand for the average person
to comfortably walk across; after all, it can be quite a workout to tread dry
sand every day. A mile would probably be unreasonable, but the technol-
ogy is not advanced enough to dump that amount of sand yet. Moreover,
situations comparable to Lake Islands might include ordinances that pro-
hibit walking over newly created sand dunes or ones that prevent using the
water in certain areas. Until those situations arise or courts develop new
precedent, the question remains: How much land can a sand pump dump
now that a sand pump can dump land?
B. The Last Littoral Right2 18
The public trust doctrine and the first three littoral entitlements in-
volve non-possessory rights for the owners' use and enjoyment, but the last
littoral right-the right to accretion and reliction-evades the nuisance bal-
ancing test because it implicates the possessory right to exclude. Accord-
ingly, this Note discusses the nature of that property entitlement separately
from the reasonableness test above.
The right to accretion and reliction deserves a standing ovation for
lasting all of these years while simultaneously befuddling so many lawyers.
Some say that the doctrine exists in order to convenience society-others
argue that the right is necessary for the littoral owner. Some say that accre-
tions are too trifling for the law-others say it's just the way things ought to
be. Florida says it's all of the above.219 Indeed, courts have termed this
216. Id. at 18.
217. FLA. STAT. § 161.211 (2005).
218. I am especially thankful to Professor Donald Campbell for his insight here.
219. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So.
2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1973) ("There are four reasons for the doctrine of accretion: (1) de minimis non
curat lex; (2) he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs imposed by the contiguity of waters
ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion; (3) it is in the interest of the community
that all land have an owner and. for convenience, the riparian is the chosen one; (4) the necessity for
preserving the riparian right of access to the water.").
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curious property interest everything from a contingent future interest 220 to
a vested right221-one going so far as to call it a natural right.222 So which
is it?
Speaking within the bounds of this Note, the right to accretion and
reliction is a vested property interest, despite the Florida Supreme Court's
deceivingly clear pronouncement that "[t~he right ... is a contingent, future
interest that only becomes a possessory interest if and when land is added
to the upland by accretion or reliction. "223
If this were a statement of the upland owner's title, then it would make
very little sense in terms of freehold estates: From a purist's standpoint, a
"contingent" future interest suggests that the riparian has a remainder,
meaning that the State has a finite estate that must end.2 24 That arrange-
ment controverts the public trust doctrine2 25 and simply cannot be the case
here.
So what did the court mean when it described the right as a contingent
future interest? The court was probably doing just that-describing the
future possessory right that a riparian would have over accreted alluvion
and using the adjective "contingent" to mean that the present possessory
right is dependent upon the gradual accumulation of sediment on the up-
land. The opinion cited authority in Brickell, which said, "[Littoral]
rights . . . give no title to the land under navigable waters except as may be
lawfully acquired by accretion, reliction, and other similar rights." 226 Well,
of course they don't give title to the tangible sediment until the alluvion
accumulates. That's the whole point of the doctrine itself,227 and the court
was likely just using the words "contingent, future interest" as adjectives to
describe the riparian's potential interest.
Now, stating the parties' actual title to the physical sand deposits has
its own problems: If the riparian has a contingent future interest in the land
under the navigable water, then the State, as a trustee for the public, would
necessarily have a present possessory interest held in a fee tail, a life estate,
or a term of years.228 But the State cannot have a finite estate without
contradicting the public trust doctrine.229
220. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1112 (Fla. 2008).
221. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934, 936
(Fla. 1987).
222. Cnty. of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 90 U.S. 46, 68-69 (1874).
223. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1112.
224. See PETER T. WENDEL, A POSSESSORY ESTATES AND FUTURE INTEREST PRIMER 100 (West
Group 2007) (1996).
225. See Merrill-Stevens Co. v. Durkee, 57 So. 428, 431 (Fla. 1911).
226. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1112 (quoting Brickell v. Trammell, 82 So. 221, 227 (Fla. 1919)).
227. See Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272
So. 2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1973) ("[Hle who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs imposed by the
contiguity of waters ought to receive whatever benefits they may bring by accretion.").
228. WENDEL, supra note 224, at 47.
229. See Merrill-Stevens Co., 57 So. at 431.
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Hypothetically and with a polite nod to the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, 230 the State could have initially granted the riparian a "future interest
only"231 conveyance: To riparian if the alluvion accumulates. That convey-
ance leaves the State with a present possessory interest held in an estate
known as a fee simple subject to an executory limitation.2 3 2 The riparian
would then have a future interest, an executory interest, that would not
vest in interest until it vested in possession.233 But then, the riparian would
hold title to the alluvion in fee simple absolute, 234 begging the question:
What happens if the water creeps inland again? Would the landowner then
lose his fee simple interest?
On another hypothetical note, the State could own the alluvion in fee
simple absolute, wait until the alluvion forms, and then grant the riparian a
present possessory interest: To riparian until the alluvion disappears. That
conveyance leaves the riparian with a present possessory interest held in an
estate known as a fee simple determinable.235 The State would then have a
future interest, a possibility of a reverter, held in fee simple absolute, that
would vest in interest upon creation.236 So again, what happens if the title
reverts, and the alluvion accumulates again? The same would likely occur
if the State granted a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. 237
The common law recognized these inconsistencies and purposefully
developed the doctrine of accretion to resolve the problems that nature
herself poses. Although it would soothe the legal soul to state the ever-
changing title to accretions and relictions more specifically within the prop-
erty vernacular, nature has other plans. Sand continually washes along the
seashores, and people cannot watch with lidless eyes for the alluvion to
form (or wash away), so the best the law can do is (1) recognize that title to
the accumulated alluvion is held in fee simple and (2) develop the doctrine
of accretion to justify the natural redistribution between neighbors. One
scholar made the same argument over 70 years ago:
If the law of accession is sufficient to explain the gain, as it
undoubtedly is, why grope for alien terms in which to desig-
nate a loss occurring at the same time, from the same
causes, and in the identical transaction? ... Accretion and
reliction normally operate on titles in fee simple ....
230. The Rule Against Perpetuities applies to contingent remainders, remainders subject to open,
and executory interests. WENDEL, supra note 224, at 173-74. The rule states, "No interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest." Id. at 173.
231. See id. at 99-100.
232. See id. at 100.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 21.
236. See id. at 20-21, 26.
237. See id.
238. Ross D. Terry, Waters and Watercourses-Title to Stream Beds and Riparian Lands-Deter-
minable Fees, 12 Tex. L. Rev. 490, 495 (1934).
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But the future interest in owning title to accumulated alluvion is not
the only issue in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.-a separate issue is
the property right to accretion as one of the sticks in the bundle that comes
along with littoral ownership. Now, of course, the Members' lawyers prob-
ably knew that arguing about the latter would only produce a steeper hill to
climb, and the Florida Supreme Court was simply answering the question
before it. But for the purposes of setting legal precedent, the two issues
cannot merely blur together in infinite harmony.
Separate the right to accretion (the legal occupation over accumulated
alluvion) from the right to accretion (the legal expectation of a doctrine to
apply in the occurrence of a happenstance). This severance explains the
misleading appearance that the Florida Supreme Court "reverse[d] 100
years of uniform holdings that littoral rights are constitutionally pro-
tected."239 The court did not reverse precedent; 240 instead, it affirmed the
holding from a line of cases dating back to 1909.241
The court did, on the other hand, confusingly use the term "contin-
gent" a second time-again as an adjective but without the "future inter-
est" language: The court was explaining that it "[did] not find the littoral
right to accretion applicable in the context of [the] Act." 242 The court
could have stopped there, but it went on to say:
[T]he right to accretion under Florida common law is a con-
tingent right. It is a right that arises from a rule of conve-
nience intended to balance public and private interests by
automatically allocating small amounts of gradually ac-
creted lands to the upland owner without resort to legal pro-
ceedings and without disturbing the upland owner's rights to
access to and use of the water.243
The court continued to explain the four justifications for the accretion doc-
trine only to say that none of them applied in the context of the beach
renourishment or under section 161.191(2) of the Act.244
All of this is true so long as future courts do not misconstrue the con-
tingency involved in this discussion. The right to accretion is contingent in
the sense that the littoral owner only has a right to claim possession if the
alluvion accumulates. The argument in this case centered around Florida's
239. Brief of Petitioner at i, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 2509219 at *1.
240. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,2612 (2010)
(plurality opinion) ("The Florida Supreme Court decision before us is consistent with these background
principles of state property law.").
241. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Assocs., 512 So. 2d 934 (Fla.
1987); Belvedere Dev. Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 476 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1985); Bd. of Trs. of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1973); Brickell v. Tram-
mel, 82 So. 221 (Fla. 1919); Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491 (Fla. 1918); Ferry Pass
Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 48 So. 643 (Fla. 1909).
242. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1118 (Fla. 2008)
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1118-19.
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ability to tinker with that contingency by creating an artificial avulsion,245
and the State's high court said that so long as the context of that tinkering
continued to do what the doctrine of accretion set out to do-balance pri-
vate and public interests through a rule of convenience-then yes, the State
could take away the littoral owner's ability to gain alluvion (if it ever ac-
creted) by also taking away the littoral owner's ability to lose property (if
the tide moved upland). 24 6
It does not necessarily follow that by taking away the ability to gain
alluvion that the littoral owner cannot have a vested property interest in
the right to accretion. Littoral rights are sticks in the bundle of property
interests that vest pursuant to owning littoral land. Look at the language in
section 161.191(2) that allegedly "took" the right to accretion:
Once the erosion control line . . . has been established ...
the common law shall no longer operate to increase or de-
crease the proportions of any upland property lying land-
ward of such line, either by accretion or erosion or by any
other natural or artificial process, except as provided in s.
161.211(2) and (3).247
Section 161.211(2) explains that "[i]f the state . . . fails to maintain [the
protected beach] and as a result thereof the shoreline gradually recedes ...
landward of the erosion control line . . . , the provisions of s. 161.191(2)
shall cease to be operative . . . ." Subsection (3) goes on to give the State a
chance to fix the protected beach within one year, and if not, "the erosion
control line shall be null and void and of no further force or effect."
Now, where in this statute does it say that a littoral owner no longer
has a property right to accretion? It says that "the common law shall no
longer operate," 248 and it says that the statute "shall cease to be opera-
tive "249 or will be "of no further force "2 50-but nothing illustrates a legisla-
tive act that destroys the right to accretion. If anything, the legislature
overtly recognizes the expectation as a vested property interest, or else it
would not so adamantly require the State to maintain the renourished
beach. Put another way, the legislation reinforces the common law policy
that whenever littoral property is subject to losing land, the owner has a
vested right to likewise gain land. Temporarily making that contingency
impossible (because "there can be no accretions to land that no longer
abuts the water") 251 does not equate to destroying the property right to
245. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2611 (plurality opinion).
246. Walton Cnty., 998 So. 2d at 1118-19.
247. FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2005).
248. Id.
249. Id. § 161.211(2).
250. Id. § 161.211(3).
251. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 130 S. Ct. at 2611 (plurality opinion) (citing Bryant v.
Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 1970) (quoting Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 288 (Fla. 1927))).
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accretion-the expectation is indeed alive and well under this statutory
scheme.
The United States Supreme Court's plurality opinion supports this dis-
tinction as well. Justice Scalia quickly dismissed the need to determine
whether the Fifth Amendment proscribes the taking of littoral rights be-
cause legal precedent dating back to the 1800s made that point very clear-
yes.252 The discussion focused instead on what the petitioners' claimed:
that the Florida Supreme Court "took" the Members' property by declar-
ing that the right to accretions did not exist when no prior precedent per-
mitted such denial of the ability to gain future accretions.25 3 That argument
failed because Florida precedent in Martin, as clarified in Bryant, allowed
the State to drain a lake and continue to claim the newly exposed land
between the MHWL and the water's edge pursuant to the doctrine of (arti-
ficial) avulsion. 254 By necessity, the State action caused the doctrine of ac-
cretion to no longer apply (again, because "there can be no accretions to
land that no longer abuts the water"). 255 Martin and Bryant never said that
the right to accretion did not exist-they said together that the doctrine did
not apply by virtue of the State making the contingency impossible.256
Remember, the central rationale behind the right to accretion and re-
liction is that "he who sustains the burden of losses and of repairs imposed
by the contiguity of waters ought to receive whatever benefits they may
bring by accretion." 257 If the State temporarily abrogates the ability to gain
land in exchange for the inability to lose it, then it seems that the Members
get the quid pro quo that the common law doctrine required. For prece-
dent purposes, lawyers and courts should note that the littoral owner's ex-
pectation (that the doctrine of accretion will apply if the contingency
reemerges) remains a legally vested property interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
A four to four split on the United States Supreme Court presents an
expected conundrum: Lawyers find powerful persuasion for future litiga-
tion, scholars try to put Humpty Dumpty back together again, jurists are
left to sift through the rubble, and the people involved go on with their
daily lives in an unsure reality. Indeed, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.
harmoniously rallied private property advocates, but it stopped short of
declaring a victory for the plurality's judicial takings theory.
The Court's plurality concluded that a judicial decision could "take"
private property rights for public use such that the Fifth Amendment would
252. Id. at 2601 n.5.
253. Id. at 2610-11.
254. Id. at 2611 (citing Martin, 112 So. at 287; Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 838-39).
255. Id. (citing Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 839 (quoting Martin, 112 So. at 288 (Brown, J., concurring))).
256. See Bryant, 238 So. 2d at 838-39 (citing Martin, 112 So. at 285).
257. Bd. of Trs. of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Medeira Beach Nominee, Inc., 272 So.
2d 209, 212-13 (Fla. 1973) (emphasis added).
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require "just compensation," 25 8 but an equal number of justices refused to
join the reasoning.259 Even so, the Court unanimously held that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's decision did not actually take away any established
property rights.260
Perhaps this case illustrates how "nuisance law literally picks up where
trespass leaves off."261' An answer to the Members' problem could not rest
on an exclusion theory, but the conjoined decisions here point towards a
governance theory as the more practical arena for these neighboring prop-
erty interests. Further, the right to accretion and reliction arguably re-
mains alive and well in Florida as a vested property interest, despite the
high court's language.
In the end, the gravity of harm that Tammy and Suzy face does not
outweigh this renourishment project's value to the public. But this Note
encourages oceanfront property owners to watch for the day when projects
like this reach a point of unreasonableness-usually, when you give people
an inch, they try to take a mile.
258. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010)
(plurality opinion).
259. Id. at 2597 (majority opinion).
260. Id. at 2613.
261. MERRILL, supra note 66, at 938.
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